We develop a theory of the emergence of merchant guilds as an e¢ cient mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, building on the complementarity between merchant guilds' ability to enforce monopoly over trade and their social capital. Unlike existing models, we focus on local merchant guilds, rather than alien guilds, accounting for the main observed features of their behavior, internal organization and relationship with rulers. Our model delivers novel predictions about the emergence, variation, functioning, and eventual decline of this highly successful historical form of network. Our theory reconciles previous explanations and the large body of historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. In doing so, we also shed novel light on the role of the guilds'social capital, and its importance for taxation, welfare, and the development of towns and their government in medieval Europe.
Introduction
Since the pioneering work by Greif et al. (1994) , merchant guilds have attracted considerable attention by economists, and for good reason. This celebrated historical institution dominated trade for several centuries, and its development was inextricably linked with the growth of medieval towns and the rise of the merchant class. The merchant guild has also been viewed by many as a shining example of social capital -see, e.g., Putnam et al., (1993) -bringing major economic and social bene…ts, thereby suggesting a very valuable potential role for such social capital even in modern economies -see, e.g., Bardhan (1996) , Dasgupta (2000) , Raiser (2001) and Stiglitz (1999) .
Is this positive view of merchant guilds justi…ed? What role did the guilds' social capital play? What is the rationale for the way merchant guilds operated, and for their relationship with medieval rulers? We address these questions theoretically, and then confront our model's predictions with the available historical evidence. The objective is to shed new light on the reasons for the emergence, organization, functioning, and eventual decline of this highly successful historical form of network.
Our model presents a very di¤erent, although complementary, theory of the emergence and role of merchant guilds relative to the existing literature and in particular to Greif et al. (1994) , who were the …rst to provide a formal model of merchant guilds. They developed a theory of alien merchant guilds -i.e., associations of alien merchants supported by the rulers of the polities in which they traded. Historically, though, most merchant guilds emerged as local merchant guilds -i.e., associations of local merchants that obtained recognition and privileges (including monopoly power over local trade) from their local rulers. Alien merchant guilds were typically formed by the members of local merchant guilds who were active in long-distance trade, and remained under the control and supervision of the guilds from the merchants'polities of origin. 1 Moreover, only a subset of local merchant guilds went on to form such foreign 'branches', primarily in the main international trade centers. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to understand the economic rationale for the emergence of local merchant guilds, and the reasons why medieval rulers were willing to grant them recognition and privileges. 2 This is all the more important as local merchants dominated medieval towns, many of which acquired considerable power and autonomy. Hence, studying the roots of merchants'organizations and their relationships with rulers is crucial in understanding the wider political economy forces that shaped the development of towns and states.
Medieval rulers did not possess a reliable civil service to collect taxes, and employed a variety 1 See, for example, Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, pp.9-11) ; Ogilvie (2011, pp. 24-25, 202-205) . This should not be taken to mean that only members of the local merchant guild of the polity of origin could be members of an alien merchant guild: associate membership was sometimes o¤ered to merchants from di¤erent cities of origin, although this practice was typically limited to speci…c times and circumstances (Ogilvie, 2011, p. 108) . Similarly, it should be clear that alien merchant guilds were also subject to some control and supervision by their host polities. 2 For a rich and detailed informal account of merchant guilds, local and alien, see Ogilvie (2011) . Our work and hers build to some extent on the extensive review of historical evidence presented in Dessí and Ogilvie (2004) . of agents for this purpose. The taxation of trade was costly and ine¢ cient, with many tolls levied in markets, as well as ports, river crossings, and other points of transit. We develop a repeated game between the ruler of a medieval polity and a large number of (local) merchants to show how merchant guilds emerged as a mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, raising revenue for the latter more e¢ ciently: merchant guilds were exempted from paying tolls, and made direct transfers to rulers. This apparently straightforward alternative to reliance on tax collectors was far from simple to implement. In order to raise enough revenue for rulers, guild members had to secure collusive pro…ts from trade. We study the conditions under which such collusion could be sustained, and its implications.
E¤ective collusion required that only guild members be authorized to trade, hence the granting of exclusive trading rights by rulers to merchant guilds. But, these exclusive rights had to be enforced, and used pro…tably. We identify two main channels through which guilds' social capital a¤ected the sustainability of collusion. When applied to groups or networks, such as merchant guilds, the notion of social capital 3 typically refers to cohesion and trust among members, and to their resulting ability to enforce group norms and engage in e¤ective collective action. In our model, social capital facilitates cooperation among guild members to achieve two important objectives: …rst, detecting and intervening to defeat attempts by non-members to undermine the guild's monopoly over trade; second, coordinating on pro…t-maximizing market strategies for the group, and appropriate punishments of any member who chooses to deviate.
By reducing the cost of e¤ective collusion, greater guild social capital tends to make granting recognition and privileges to guilds more attractive for the ruler. On the other hand, greater social capital within a guild also increases its bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruler (re ‡ecting the greater degree of cohesion among guild members), allowing the guild to secure a part of the collusive pro…ts it generates.
Our theory identi…es a number of other important determinants, beyond the guild's social capital, of the ruler's choice between the merchant guild regime and the tax collector regime: these include the strength and uncertainty of consumer demand, the geographical and population characteristics of the polity, and the degree of patience of the merchants. The model therefore yields a rich set of empirical predictions: we confront these with the available historical evidence in Sections 5 and 6, where they help to shed light on the timing and variation of emergence of merchant guilds; on their organization, norms and behavior; on their relationship with rulers and their role in the development of medieval towns and their administration; and …nally on their decline.
The welfare implications of merchant guilds are complex. Our model shows that only those with su¢ cient social capital would have been granted recognition and privileges by rulers, since they represented a less costly way of raising revenue than reliance on tax collectors. In this sense, merchant guilds represented an e¢ ciency improvement relative to the taxation alternatives available at the time. From the perspective of consumers, we show that the merchant guild regime implied the same level of consumer prices as the tax collector regime, except when demand realizations were large enough to require guild members to coordinate on a price below the monopoly price: in this case, consumers were better o¤ under the guild regime. These implications are favorable to merchant guilds. On the other hand, the guilds'social capital may also have had less favorable welfare implications. Our model highlights one of these: e¤ective collusion implied an upper bound on guild membership, which in some circumstances involved membership restrictions and exclusion. At the same time, the guilds'social capital, by increasing their bargaining power, enabled them to secure a share of collusive pro…ts (net of transfers to the ruler). This generated inequality within the merchant class, with guilded merchants earning much more than other merchants who were excluded from trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short introduction to merchant guilds and to the medieval taxation of trade, which motivates our model. Section 3 sets out the baseline model. Section 4 studies taxation and trade, and the conditions to sustain collusion. The choice between the tax-collector regime and the guild regime is …rst analyzed in Section 5. This section also reviews the historical evidence on the model's predictions. We then extend the model in a variety of ways in Section 6, and discuss the evidence on the resulting additional implications. The …nal Section 7 compares our theory to alternative theories of the emergence of merchant guilds, and o¤ers our concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Motivating evidence
This section brie ‡y reviews the historical evidence on merchant guilds and on the taxation of trade in the Middle Ages, which motivates our model.
Medieval merchant guilds
Medieval merchant guilds were associations of merchants in a particular town or city. The merchants could be wholesale and retail sellers, and trade one or more types of good, including spices 4 , wine, grain, timber, furs, herring, honey, textiles 5 , bullion, etc. Some guilds included members active in production as well as trade: historians often refer to these as craft guilds but the distinction is blurred, as noted by Epstein (1991, p. 130) , "Within many craft guilds were rules on the conduct of retail trade and signs that some masters had transformed themselves 4 According to Lopez and Raymond (2001, pp. 108-114) , the term 'spices'came to include not only seasonings, perfumes, dyestu¤s and medicinals, but also a much wider variety of goods. The list they present, from Pegolotti's manual of commercial practice dated between 1310 and 1340, includes obvious candidates such as anise, ginger, cinnamon, cloves, fennel, pepper and nutmeg, but also items as varied as asphalt, wax, glue, gum, indigo, ivory, lead, tin, rice, copper, coral, soap, sugar, sulphur, turpentine. 5 Notably cotton, wool, and silk.
into wealthy merchants... In a sense, all craftsmen selling to the public were merchants... a sharp line does not separate the craft and merchant guilds". For the purposes of our model, what matters is trade: thus our analysis applies mainly to 'merchant guilds' (whose members specialized in trade), but can also be applied to those 'craft guilds' whose members engaged signi…cantly in retail trade, as well as di¤erent aspects of production. It does not, on the other hand, apply to craft guilds whose members specialized in production and sold their output to merchants (outside the guild). 6
Local merchant guilds
Our model focuses mainly on local merchant guilds. Historically, most merchant guilds emerged as associations of local merchants. These local merchant guilds were ubiquitous in medieval Europe (in England alone, for example, there were over one hundred towns with a local merchant guild). 7 Local merchant guilds were supported by their local rulers, who granted them o¢ cial recognition and a variety of important privileges, including exclusive rights over local trade. 8 These privileges were sometimes granted as part of charters given to towns, which also gave the towns a degree of political, administrative and …nancial autonomy. This was the case in England, where many such town charters contained "a clause similar to the following: We grant a Gild Merchant with a hanse and other customs belonging to the Gild, so that [or 'and that'] no one who is not of the Gild may merchandise in the said town, except with the consent of the burgesses..." (Gross, 1890, p. 8) . Thus English local merchant guilds were granted the right to exclude any non-member from trade. In continental Europe, the granting of monopoly privileges to local merchant guilds was not always linked to the granting of greater political autonomy to towns. A good example is the guild of the mercatores aque ("water merchants") in Paris: in 1170, the French king, Philip Augustus, "granted them a virtual monopoly of the Seine tra¢ c between the bridges of Paris and Mantes...they increasingly assumed the responsibilities of municipal government under Philip's grandson, Louis IX...The water merchants may be regarded as the embryo of the municipal government recognized later in the century." (Baldwin, 1986, p. 348 ). Yet under Philip Augustus, "Unlike those of most towns in the royal domain, the bourgeois of Paris were permitted no semblance of autonomy" (Baldwin, 1986, p. 349 and Luchaire, 1902, p. 239). 6 Richardson (2001, pp. 233-234) contrasts three types of craft guilds. The …rst, 'manufacturing' guilds, produced consumer goods and "sold most of their merchandise to merchants who resold it". These are essentially guilds who specialized in production. The second type provided local services (e.g., innkeepers), while the third type provided victuals. Richardson (2004, p. 13) then argues that manufacturing guilds did not possess rights to be sole sellers. This is entirely consistent with our analysis, since rulers could extract surplus from trade by giving exclusive rights to merchants, in return for transfers. 7 See Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), for a list of all those for which there is explicit documentary evidence, many dating back at least to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The actual number is likely to have been even greater, implying that by the thirteenth century, local merchant guilds were "one of the most prevalent and characteristic features of English municipalities." (p. 22). 8 Schütt (1980, p. 79) . For reviews and discussions, see Dessí and Ogilvie (2004) , Ogilvie (2011). The privileges granted to local merchant guilds in many medieval European cities meant that alien merchants could be either excluded from trade, or allowed to trade only subject to a number of restrictions clearly intended to favor local merchants. 9 Among the most common of these restrictions were "staple" rights and brokerage rights. Local guilds'"rights of staple" meant that alien merchants had to bring their merchandise to municipal warehouses where members of the local merchant guild could buy them at favorable prices. 10 Local guilds'brokerage rights meant that alien merchants could not trade directly with consumers or with other alien merchants: they had to use members of the local merchant guild as intermediaries (brokers). 11 Local merchant guilds also restricted access to towns: "Outsiders might enter and leave the town for purposes of wholesale trading only and for only a limited number of days, varying from place to place to between 14 and 40". 12 At the same time, local merchant guilds could exclude from trade local individuals who were not members of the guild. 13 In some cases, they could also bene…t from market regulations that gave them a large competitive advantage relative to local producers. 14 
Alien merchant guilds
Some local merchant guilds established foreign branches ("colonies" 15 and "consulates") 16 in important trade centers, when a signi…cant number of their members engaged in long-distance trade (many did not). These alien merchant guilds 17 were closely linked to the local merchant guilds of their polities of origin: for example, merchants from a given town or city typically had to be members of the local merchant guild in their town or city in order to become members of any of its branches in other towns or cities, and being expelled from the local guild of their town or city of origin also entailed exclusion from all the alien merchant guilds linked to it. 18 9 1 7 For an analysis of a broader set of mercantile communities, including some with shared cultural beliefs but no formal organization, see Gelderblom and Grafe (2010). 1 8 Ogilvie (2011, pp. 108, 112).
Medieval taxation of trade
The use of tolls or customs to tax trade in Europe can be traced back to the Roman imperial custom system. 19 This included taxes on sales transactions and taxes on goods in transit. Ad valorem tax rates typically varied between 2% and 5%; there were also some …xed payments.
Toll stations were situated at appropriate locations in the customs territories. Customs were collected thanks to close cooperation between civil administration and the army.
From at least the third century onwards, foreign merchants were subject to tight controls. In the Byzantine customs system, from the sixth century onwards, agents referred to as comerciarii were responsible for the apotheke ('customs houses' or 'commercial hostels'), where imported goods were bought and sold, and taxes collected. O¢ cial seals were attached to merchandise to prove that the appropriate tax had been paid. Under Charlemagne, trade was restricted to speci…c public markets, active at particular times and locations (legitimus mercatus): royal o¢ cials collected tolls from participating merchants.
In the post-Carolingian Middle Ages, when central authority was weakened and power dispersed, we nevertheless …nd many of the same basic features of trade taxation. Throughout medieval Europe, rulers tried to restrict trade to public markets, including a multitude of o¢cial fairs 20 , to ensure taxes could be collected. 21 Tolls (customs, duties, subsidies) were collected at coastal ports as well as river and road toll stations, and mountain passes. 22 
The baseline model
This section introduces our model. Consider a medieval polity with three types of risk-neutral players: a ruler, N identical merchants, and a tax-collector. 23 The market. Merchants sell a homogeneous good whose unit cost is normalized to zero and compete to attract a single representative consumer. In every trading period 2 [1; ::; +1) they quote prices. The consumer purchases one unit of the product. His utility from consumption is
when (in period ) he buys at price p , and zero otherwise (we use the superscript to indicate time). The willingness to pay for the product v is a random variable identically and indepen- 1 9 Our brief review of the early medieval taxation of trade, including its Roman background, draws substantially on Middleton (2005) .
2 0 Probably the most famous example of medieval fairs is that of the Champagne fairs, but of course there were very many other fairs and markets, including numerous local ones accommodating primarily local trade. 2 (1999, p. 32) . For a broader review of medieval taxation (not focusing speci…cally on trade), see Bonney (1999) . 2 3 We explicitly focus on risk-neutral parties in order not to rely on risk-sharing mechanisms that have been already analyzed in the network literature applied to economic history -see, e.g., Abramitzky (2008) . We discuss the relationship between our model and this literature in Section 6. dently distributed over time: for simplicity, it is equal to > 0 with probability and to 0 otherwise.
The ruler. The ruler governs the polity: he provides certain public goods, such as law enforcement and defence, and …nances these with various sources of revenue, including the taxation of trade. He also spends on activities that provide him with private bene…ts, such as military campaigns and court display. 24 For our purposes it is su¢ cient to treat his expenditures and his other sources of revenue as given exogenously, and to focus on the revenue he can raise from the taxation of trade. The ruler is assumed to maximize this revenue. This is a reasonable assumption for the historical period under consideration, when rulers typically attached a low weight to the well-being of ordinary consumers. 25 To maximize his revenue from local trade, the ruler has two options. First, he can employ a tax collector (see the discussion of tolls in Section 2). Second, he can grant recognition and exclusive rights over trade to a merchant guild, in return for an appropriate transfer. These are essentially, from a …scal perspective, two alternative taxation regimes. Let us consider each regime in turn, starting with the second option.
The guild. If the ruler chooses to grant recognition to a merchant guild, he endows it with privileges, notably the power to exclude individual merchants from trade (see the discussion of merchant guilds' exclusive rights in Section 2). However, the exercise of this power is not costless. Speci…cally, there are two kinds of duty that guild members must perform in order to enforce the guild's monopoly over trade and earn monopoly pro…ts. First, when the guild has size n < N , insiders must exclude outsiders from trade. We assume that this exclusion e¤ort requires a total per-period investment equal to x(N n), which is shared equally among guild members. This cost obviously increases with the number of outsiders to be excluded. It represents the cost of monitoring to detect any attempts by non-members to undermine the guild's monopoly, and intervening to ensure the attempts are not successful. Greater cohesion and trust among guild members (i.e., greater social capital) will reduce this cost, making it easier to cooperate, communicate and avoid free-riding problems. In the baseline model we assume that e¤ective exclusion is only possible if every member contributes -i.e., pays the individual cost x (N n) =n: then outsiders are unable to trade. Otherwise, outsiders can successfully undercut the price that the guild members have agreed to charge. In the extensions to the baseline model we show that our results continue to hold when we assume a di¤erent monitoring technology, in which limited free-riding is less harmful.
The second type of duty required for the guild to operate successfully is an internal organization and coordination e¤ort. This entails a total per-period cost (n 1) f , which captures the investment guild members must collectively sustain to coordinate successfully their actionsi.e., the cost of de…ning and agreeing on their common market (pricing) strategy, of designing guild rules including a punishment code, of exchanging information, etc. 26 We can think of this to some extent as a time cost: guild members had to participate in collective activities, such as meetings, social and religious gatherings, elections of guild o¢ cers, admission of new members, and so on. Importantly, the disutility of spending time on these collective activities will be lower in groups that have greater social capital, interpreted here as greater cohesion, closer ties, and more congruent preferences. Moreover, more social capital within a guild will also make coordination easier through greater trust and easier reliance on shared information. We will return to this interpretation of f as re ‡ecting social capital below.
When the ruler grants recognition and privileges to a merchant guild, he requires an ex ante fee R G , which is shared equally among the guild's members. 27 This fee is set at the level which solves a standard Nash-bargaining problem between the ruler and the guild with weights and 1
, respectively. 28
The tax-collector. In the absence of merchant organizations, the ruler delegates trade taxation to an agent: the tax-collector. Speci…cally, he endows the agent with the right to collect taxes on trade in the polity, in return for an ex ante royalty fee R T . This is essentially 'tax farming', a very widespread practice in medieval Europe -see, e.g., Lyon and Verhulst (1967), Webber and Wildavsky (1986), Johnson and Koyama (2014) . In every period, the tax-collector chooses a tax t that merchants have to pay on each unit of product they sell. The tax revenue that he can levy is t as long as trade occurs. Collecting taxes is costly, and the cost increases with the revenue to be raised: for example, more time needs to be spent at public markets and toll stations (see the discussion of medieval trade taxation in Section 2). We model this by assuming that in every trading period the tax collector pays a cost c (t ) = t , with 2 [0; 1], which is increasing in the revenue t that can be extracted from the merchants. 2 6 The importance of sharing information and designing guild rules, including possible sanctions, aimed at maximizing guild members'collective pro…ts can be readily appreciated from the following examples. In Silesia, the rules for the town linen markets were designed to give guilded merchants a competitive advantage relative to producers (weavers): "The market regulations... restricted the time for purchasing to a few hours. When the striking of the clock opened the market in midmorning, hundreds of weavers rushed to the central market square. The houses of the wealthiest merchants were situated around the square, where they sat in front of their houses on high chairs overlooking the crowd. The sellers came to the foot of the chairs to o¤er their pieces. From above, the merchant checked the piece with a short glance and gave their price. If the weaver agreed, a chalk mark was made on the linen... the weavers had little chance to get a good deal given the level of activity on the market square. They ‡ocked to the merchants' chairs by the dozen and had to accept the prices o¤ered quickly. By agreement within the guild, no merchant was allowed to make an o¤er for a piece once it was signed with chalk. As the chalk mark could only be removed by washing the cloth, which was impossible given the restricted market time, once a piece was marked, the weaver could not invite alternative o¤ers from other merchants. Postponing the sale of a piece for a week was usually impossible because the weavers very often lived from hand to mouth and were unable to store their linen. Thus, the guild members prevented competition within their ranks" (Boldorf, 2009, p.180) . The next example highlights the importance of information and punishments: in English towns, alien merchants coming to trade "were carefully watched, lest they should sell or buy under colour or cover of a faithless gild brother's freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity or otherwise severely punished if found guilty of this o¤ence" (Gross, 1890, p. 48).
Payments to rulers and commitment. We assume that the ruler can commit to the chosen taxation regime at = 0, so that in both regimes payments to rulers take the simple form of a single ex-ante fee. This makes it possible to identify clearly some of the key trade-o¤s between recognizing a guild and relying on a tax collector, abstracting from commitment problems. We discuss the implications of imperfect commitment in the section on extensions to the baseline model.
Timing and strategies. At time = 0 the ruler decides whether to grant recognition to a merchant guild or hire an agent as tax-collector. In every trading period 1 the game proceeds as follows:
Demand is realized;
Merchants quote prices;
Trade takes place.
There is perfect monitoring: if a guild member deviates by undercutting in any period, the other members observe the identity of the deviating "brother" by the end of that period. This assumption seems reasonable in the case of medieval polities. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2, most of the trading activities at that time were taking place in public markets where merchants could easily monitor each other's pricing strategy.
All agents have a common discount factor 2 [0; 1). The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Finally, in the baseline model we assume that
This assumption simply allows for the possibility of a single-member guild -i.e., the revenue that can be obtained from trade is greater than the cost of excluding all but one merchant -and a guild that includes every merchant in the polity -the (expected) revenue is greater than the operating costs when all merchants are admitted to membership of the guild. In the extensions to the baseline model and in the Appendix we will relax this hypothesis.
The basic trade-o¤ facing revenue-maximizing rulers
We begin by characterizing the pro…t that the ruler can achieve when merchants are not organized in a guild, and then proceed to examine the role of guilds.
Trade and taxation in the absence of merchant guilds
Suppose that the ruler hires an agent entitled to impose taxation and collect the corresponding revenue. The tax rate is chosen to maximize the revenue from taxation. We will solve the game using a backward-induction logic. Assume that t 0 is the per-unit tax that merchants have to pay in period . In that period merchant i earns a pro…t equal to
where p (p 1 ; ::; p N ) 2 < N + is the vector of prices quoted by the N competing merchants in period . Merchant-i's individual demand is
which is equal to 1 M if M N merchants (including i) quote the lowest market price and thus share the consumer's demand uniformly, and is equal to zero otherwise (we use the subscript i to indicate merchants). 29 The tax collector will optimally set t = in every trading period in which v = and t = 0 otherwise, so as to implement the monopoly outcome. In fact, he has no incentive to choose t lower than , because this would extract less than the monopoly pro…t. In addition, setting t higher than would also not be pro…table because is the maximal pro…t that merchants can (collectively) repay in every trading period. Hence, the tax collector's (expected)
intertemporal pro…t is
which is increasing in the consumer's expected willingness to pay , and decreasing in the cost of collecting taxes . The ruler fully extracts this surplus by setting R T = V T .
Merchant guilds: trade, taxation and privileges
Suppose now that n N merchants organize themselves as a group able to act in their collective interest: the guild. The ruler grants privileges to them and, in particular, monopoly power over To answer this question we must …rst examine how the viability of e¤ective collusion among guild members, yielding monopoly pro…ts for the guild, depends on the parameters of the model, and the implications this has for the guild's optimal size, as well as its performance relative to the tax collector. Before providing the equilibrium analysis it is useful to frame the timing of the game within each stage. The sequence of moves within every trading period is as follows:
Merchants decide whether to pay the operating cost or not.
Demand is realized.
Merchants simultaneously and independently quote prices and decide whether to pay the exclusion cost.
Pro…ts are realized.
We will look for a SPNE of the game in which in every trading period guild members pay the operating cost, while they exclude outsiders and charge the monopoly price p M = if and only if v = . Such an outcome can enforce the monopoly outcome as long as: (i) each merchant does not pro…t from undercutting the monopoly price; (ii) it is in each merchant's best interest to pay both the operating and the exclusion costs. The punishment code is the simplest one could imagine: following any deviation (be it a price deviation or simply free-riding on exclusion and operating costs) the guild is dissolved and merchants price competitively -i.e., p = 0so that each obtains a pro…t equal to zero, which is the lowest payo¤ they can obtain. In this sense the punishment is optimal. Alternatively, one could assume that if a member deviates, the other guild members exclude the deviating member at the cost of x, and continue to operate the guild, colluding to set the monopoly price without him. This punishment code will be preferred if it is more pro…table for the guild members that do not deviate. In both cases the deviating member is punished with a zero payo¤. Thus, our equilibrium analysis does not hinge on the speci…c way the zero-pro…t punishment is enforced after deviation.
The equilibrium described above must be immune to three types of deviations. First, every guild member should be willing to pay his share of the guild's operating (organization and coordination) costs. This will be the case as long as the continuation value of doing so is positive -i.e., each member's expected pro…t is non-negative on equilibrium path
Second, every guild member should be willing to contribute to the exclusion e¤ort. Given that the guild cannot make pro…ts if the exclusion cost is not entirely paid, it is easy to show that each merchant will contribute as long as
which is obviously implied by (1) .
Third, no guild member should be tempted to undercut the others. Formally, undercutting the monopoly price is not pro…table as long as the following self-enforceability constraint holds
The left-hand side captures the (discounted) expected gain from cooperation, while the righthand side is the spot gain from deviation. The continuation payo¤ after deviation is zero given the guild's punishment code. Note that (2) implies (1) . Hence, undercutting in the positive demand state is the only deviation that must be taken into account. Of course, deviations are not feasible when the demand state is low -see Section 6 for an extension of the model to a continuous demand state.
Rearranging condition (2), it follows that collusion is sustainable as long as
Notice that the impact of the guild density n on the self-enforceability constraint is ambiguous.
In fact, di¤erentiating with respect to n we have
This expression suggests that there are three e¤ects shaping the way a higher density n impacts the incentive to undercut the monopoly price. First, other things being equal, as n grows larger each guild member is more tempted to undercut p M because the monopoly pro…t must be shared among more people -i.e., the individual revenue from collusion =n becomes smaller as n increases. Second, operating costs are increasing in guild size, thus a higher n , by increasing coordination costs, tends to make collusion less appealing because the continuation value of cooperation shrinks. Third, a higher density reduces the cost of excluding outsiders, which (other things being equal) tends to make collusion easier to sustain since it increases the continuation value of cooperation. This e¤ect becomes stronger when the cost of excluding each outsider x grows larger. It should be noted that and have a quite di¤erent impact on x: a higher tends to reduce it, while a higher increases it. Thus and play a di¤erent role in the analysis.
Summing up, while the …rst and second e¤ects point in the direction of making collusion harder to sustain when n increases, the third e¤ect goes in the opposite direction. We can therefore establish the following result.
Lemma 1 If x x collusion is always viable in the guild regime regardless of n. Otherwise, collusion can be sustained if, and only if,
where n decreases with f , and increases with , , x and .
This result shows that if the exclusion cost x is su¢ ciently large, the third e¤ect described above dominates -i.e., when x x larger guilds are more pro…table because they are able to better minimize total exclusion costs. Hence, as the number of insiders grows larger it is easier to sustain the monopoly outcome, meaning that as long as a single-member guild is viable (as stated in assumption A1) 30 the monopoly outcome is sustainable regardless of guild size. When instead exclusion costs are not so important and the other two e¤ects dominate, there is an endogenous upper-bound on guild size -i.e., n n. Essentially, guilds that are excessively dense bear high coordination costs and are less able to deter price deviations. Hence, collusion is viable only if the guild density is not too large. This constraint becomes tighter when coordination costs are higher, as re ‡ected by a larger f ; it softens instead when the probability of being in a positive demand state increases, as re ‡ected by a higher ; when the market becomes more valuable, as re ‡ected by a higher ; when merchants become more patient, which is captured by a higher discount factor ; or when exclusion is more costly, as re ‡ected by a higher x. For simplicity, hereafter we assume (without loss of insights) that N > n.
The guild density is chosen so as to solve the following maximization problem
subject to (n) 0.
Note that the impact of the density on the guild's objective function is ambiguous. When n increases the cost of excluding outsiders shrinks: insiders need to exclude fewer outsiders.
However, as the number of insiders grows larger the guild's operating cost also increases since coordination becomes more expensive. Hence, the guild's objective function is increasing in n if, and only if,
As we have already shown above, the impact of the density on the self-enforceability constraint is ambiguous too. This makes the choice of the guild's size a non-obvious problem. The key insight is that while the objective function is increasing in n as long as x x, the self-enforceability constraint (2) softens as a response to a higher n if x x > x, meaning that even if exclusion costs are large enough to induce a positive relationship between the guild's expected pro…t and its density, it may well be the case that a larger density ampli…es each member's incentive to undercut the monopoly price -i.e., x x.
Let n be the optimal density and denote by W (n ) the value function associated with the guild's maximization problem. In the next proposition we examine how the tension between the two e¤ects just described shapes the optimal guild size. Hence, the guild's ability to exclude outsiders plays a crucial role in the trade-o¤ discussed above. This ability will depend on several factors, including the geographical and population characteristics of the polity, which may make it easier or harder to detect alien or excluded local merchants who engage in unauthorized trade, as well as the polity's openness to foreigners, and its attractiveness to alien merchants. The ability to exclude non-members from trade will also depend, on the other hand, on the degree of trust among guild members, and the extent to which they are able to overcome free-riding incentives and cooperate to monitor and intervene e¤ectively: in other words, on their social capital. Thus social capital a¤ects several parameters in our model: greater social capital tends to reduce exclusion costs, parameterized by x, and also coordination costs, parameterized by f , as discussed earlier.
In the following we will focus only on the most interesting case in which the optimal guild's size is interior -i.e., x 2 (x; x) so that n = n --and neglect corner solutions, which are less appealing from an historical perspective (see the Appendix for a complete characterization).
Solving the model backward, the Nash bargaining problem between the guild and the ruler is:
where, as explained before, V T is the ruler's outside option, which is the expected payo¤ he would obtain by hiring a tax-collector. The outside option of the guild is zero since merchants would make no pro…ts if a tax-collector were hired. It is then immediate to verify that the solution of (3) entails:
which also de…nes the ruler's pro…t from granting recognition and privileges to a guild.
Merchant guild versus tax-collector
Building on the previous results, we can now examine under which conditions the ruler prefers to recognize a merchant guild rather than hiring a tax collector. Comparing R G and V T we …nd that Proposition 3 Assume that n = n. There exists a threshold 2 (0; 1) such that the ruler prefers to grant recognition to the guild if, and only, if . The threshold is increasing in x, f and N , and decreasing in , and .
Intuitively, the ruler's choice between the guild regime and the tax collector regime depends on the costs associated with each. The guild regime can entail two types of cost, coordination costs and exclusion costs, whose relative importance varies with guild size. These costs need to be weighed against the cost of relying on an agent to collect taxes. Paucity of data for the historical period under consideration makes it very di¢ cult to verify these empirically; nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some information from historical sources such as charters granted by rulers, municipal records, court records, and guild statutes. We consider evidence from such sources below, while emphasizing the important caveat that many records and documents from the eleventh, twelth and thirteenth centuries (and of course earlier) have been lost. Indeed, some of the important work carried out by medieval historians entailed trying to infer information about lost documents from occasional references to such documents in subsequent, surviving ones.
Predictions and historical evidence
Our model yields a number of implications for the emergence, operation and decline of merchant guilds. We now review the historical evidence on these predictions. Other things being equal:
Prediction 1 (Guild emergence): Guilds are more likely to emerge when the expected pro…tability of trade, represented by and , is higher.
Historically, the European economy started to grow substantially in the eleventh century:
the period until the fourteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in production, trade, and consumer demand. 31 This is the period when local merchant guilds emerged and became widespread. 32 Moreover, as the model would predict, merchant guilds were typically established in towns, and not in smaller market centres, where trade yielded revenue for rulers through tolls collected by o¢ cials. 33 For example, merchant guilds were established early on in most of the largest 34 Richardson and McBride (2009) , mortality rates in much of this period were low, suggesting that was relatively high, which is also consistent with our model. 3 3 For many examples of such smaller market centres, and their tolls, see Britnell (2000) . 3 4 A town with at least 2000 inhabitants was 'large'at the time. 3 5 Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), gives the following dates for the earliest reference to these towns' merchant guilds: Winchester (Henry II), York (1130-1), Lincoln (Henry II) , Oxford (Henry II), Ipswich (1200), Canterbury (1093-1109), Gloucester (1200), Nottingham (c.1189), Leicester (1107-1118), Bury St. Edmund's (1198), Dunwich (1200), Wallingford (Henry II). The mention Henry II refers to charters given by Henry II, King of England in 1154-89. 3 6 Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), gives the following dates for the earliest reference to these towns' merchant guilds: Weymouth (1442), Ludlow (1461), Poole (1568). states). For example, in his detailed study of the West Midlands of England, Dyer (1992, p.145) notes how "all of the towns had much in common, notably in their varied occupations -15 or 20 are recorded for some of the lesser towns, rising to 50 in the case of Worcester 37 ... The bigger towns gave opportunities for a wider range of specialists, as well as for traders on a large scale". Note however that larger towns are also likely to have had a larger population of potentially active merchants, N . Thus we would expect guilds in these towns to have had plenty of social capital, enabling them to be either large and inclusive, yet able to coordinate easily and successfully (i.e., low f ), or more exclusive, with fewer, well-organized members able to cooperate successfully and deter any attempts by non-members to undermine their monopoly over trade (i.e., low x). We therefore turn to the evidence on social capital. Merchant guilds were social networks whose members participated in a variety of social and religious activities together; they held regular assemblies and feasts; when abroad, they lived in their own quarters of foreign cities and interacted closely. At home as well as abroad, they provided mutual assistance when in di¢ culty. 38 Close and repeated interaction facilitated monitoring and the exchange of information, helping to build and sustain trust and cohesion.
The historical evidence from surviving records shows that merchant guild members cooperated to enforce and protect their exclusive rights. They did this in a variety of ways. Their exclusive rights, granted at earlier dates, were sometimes challenged in subsequent periods, and merchant guild members cooperated to defend them in court. For example, "In 1330 the major and community of the town of Bedford were summoned to answer to the king by what warrant they claim to have a Gild Merchant... so that anyone who is not of that Gild may not merchandise...".
In reply to the summons, "the burgesses show a charter of Richard I, granting a Gild Merchant..." and argue their case. 39 Similar examples are available for other merchant guilds. 40 There are also records of merchant guild members intervening directly to enforce their exclusive rights, and then defending their intervention in court when challenged. 41 For example, "In 1280 several burgesses of Newcastle-under-Lyme were summoned by the king for seizing ten ‡eeces of wool belonging to Richard the Baker of Sta¤ord... They say that they seized Richard's wool because he bought it contrary to the liberty of the Gild; and they show a charter of Henry III...". 42 3 7 Our note: Worcester indeed had a merchant guild. 3 8 Coornaert (1948, p. 218); Gross (1890, pp. 34-5). 3 9 Gross, 1890, p. 37. Note that Richard I was King of England in 1189-1199. 4 0 For example, Chester, Beaumaris, Conway, Bala, Newborough, Carnarvon, Harlech, Criccieth, Maccles…eld (Gross, 1890, pp. [38] [39] 42) . 4 1 It is precisely thanks to surviving court records that we have this kind of evidence. It seems likely that many such cases were unchallenged and hence unrecorded. 4 Merchant guilds often opposed powerful lords: for example, "Alan Basset lord of Wycombe... attempted to get rid of the gild merchant and allow free trade in hides and wool in the town.
The burgesses, in this case synonymous with the gild, brought an action against him in the King's Court (Curia Regis) claiming that they had their gild merchant by charter from King John". 43 Merchant guild members successfully coordinated on pro…t-maximizing strategies vis-à-vis alien merchants. This did not always entail complete exclusion -in particular, restrictions were often relaxed on particular days, "no one, except a gildsman, shall buy honey, suet, salt herring, nor any kind of oil, nor mill-stones, nor fresh leather, nor any kind of fresh skins; nor keep a winetavern, nor sell cloth by retail, except on market and fair day". 44 As Gross points out, "gildsmen were enlightened enough to perceive that more complete freedom of trade on those days attracted a greater multitude of people... and thus conduced to their commercial prosperity". 45 Yet guild members often enjoyed preemption rights: for example, the Southampton ordinances dictated that "no simple inhabitant nor stranger shall bargain for nor buy any kind of merchandise coming to the town before burgesses of the Gild Merchant". 46 Thus successful coordination and cooperation by guild members required elaboration and implementation of more complex strategies when dealing with alien merchants than simply …xing prices by guild members and excluding everyone else. These also included requirements for alien merchants to "bring their wares to 'the Common Hall'or other speci…ed public place, and there expose them for sale, in order that their goods could be more easily examined, and their mercantile transactions more readily supervised". 47 Moreover, alien merchants were often restricted to a maximum number of days they could remain in the town, and "during this time they were carefully watched, lest they should sell or buy under... cover of a faithless gild-brother's freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity or otherwise severely punished, if found guilty of this o¤ence". 48 Coordination and cooperation among guild members was further enhanced by a variety of guild norms; for example, "the gildsman was generally under obligation to share all purchases with his brethren, that is to say, if he bought a quantity of a given commodity, any other gildsmen could claim a portion of it at the same price at which he purchased it". 49 Prediction 3 (Guild decline): Guilds are more likely to decline when the cost of relying on agents to collect taxes ( ) decreases, and when characteristics of the polity make it harder for guilds to enforce their monopolies over trade (increasing x and/or f ). 4 3 The quotation is from Fryde (1985, p. 222), citing as source: Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, vol. XI, 7-9 Henry III (London 1955), p. 415, no. 2055. 4 4 Extract from the ordinances of Southampton, cited by Gross (1890, p. 47). 4 5 Gross (1890, p. 47). 4 6 Gross (1890, p .48). 4 7 Gross (1890, p. 47). 4 8 Gross (1890, p. 48). 4 propensity of consumers to buy goods from abroad"; (iv) the "increasing importance of exported manufactures for English employment and national income". Moreover, export-led production increased not only in large towns, but also in small towns and rural areas. For example, if we look at English cloth 52 production, we …nd that "In the …rst signi…cant phase of export growth between 1350 and 1400 the chief bene…ciaries were older towns... In the second main phase from 5 0 Ogilvie (2011) focuses on the guilds' gradual loss of power and decline. See also Hickson and Thompson (1991) , who focus instead on one step in this process of decline, the elimination of guild entry restrictions. 5 1 Johnson and Koyama (2014) also draw attention to how, following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, "the English state borrowed on a new scale; Parliament gained control of expenditure and, from 1693 onwards, guaranteed loan repayment; the Bank of England, formed in 1694, began to issue long-term loans which now comprised a national debt... and a secondary market grew up that securitized this new debt". As we shall see below, one of the ways in which merchant guilds bene…ted medieval rulers, in return for their privileges, was the provision of large loans that helped to alleviate their …nancing constraints. The increased ability to borrow from other sources in the 18th century thus further reduced the value of merchant guilds to the English state. 5 2 Cloth became one of England's most important exports. the 1470s the chief bene…ciaries were the rural or small-town industries of western Wiltshire, Devon and elsewhere". 53 In sum, higher rural demand must have created pro…table opportunities for merchants, including merchants who were not guild members, who could sell imported goods to rural inhabitants, buy from them goods to be sold abroad, and increasingly trade with them goods produced in di¤erent parts of the country. Indeed, by the sixteenth century, we observe a substantial development of 'mercantile' networks "that made it advantageous for artisans to live in particular towns and industrial villages, especially if they were producing goods in demand over considerable distances. Local trade between village weaver and village tanner had given way, in part, to trade over longer distances with merchant intermediaries... non-agricultural activity grew in rural areas, but it was characteristically more merchant-dependent than in the thirteenth century". 54 In other words, merchant guilds' costs of preventing non-members from undermining their pro…ts (x) increased substantially by the sixteenth century -which is consistent with merchant guild decline starting in this period. As we have seen, improvements in taxation further tilted the balance against merchant guilds, contributing to their decline. . 5 4 Britnell (2000, pp. 20-21) . 5 5 See Gelderblom (2013, pp. 20; 25-26) . 5 6 Gelderblom (2013, p. 27). 5 7 Gelderblom (2013, p. 15 ).
(Hanse). By coordinating their actions, the members of the German Hanse were able to obtain substantial commercial privileges for their merchants trading in northern Europe 58 which is also consistent with a slower decline of merchant guilds.
Prediction 4 (Guilds, rulers and transfers): Guilds will make transfers to rulers in return for their privileges, and they will be exempted from tolls imposed by tax collectors.
In our model, under the 'guild'regime, merchant guild members are exempted from taxation by a tax collector, and use (part of) their collusive pro…ts to make direct transfers to rulers.
The historical evidence shows that merchant guilds were indeed granted exemptions from a variety of tolls and other taxes, and made direct transfers to their rulers. 60 In England, for example, the same town charters that granted legal recognition and monopoly privileges to the local merchant guild generally granted exemptions from all tolls and other taxes, in exchange for a …xed sum or farm (…rma burgi ) to be paid annually by the town to the ruler (Gross, 1890) .
Membership of the local merchant guild carried corresponding duties and bene…ts: chief among the obligations was participation in the town's assessments and payment of pecuniary charges, which ensured that the …rma burgi was duly paid and the privileges granted in the charter maintained. On the bene…t side, local guild members enjoyed the right to trade freely and were generally exempt from all tolls, while "unfranchised merchants, when allowed to practise their vocation, were hemmed in on every side by onerous restrictions. Of these the most irksome was probably the payment of toll on all wares that they were permitted to buy or sell", Gross (1890).
In Flanders, a similar pattern can be observed from the early twelth century: the town of St.
Omer obtained freedom from all tolls and other taxes in 1128 in return for a …xed annual sum or farm. 61 The local merchant guild in St. Omer enjoyed a variety of monopolistic privileges and contributed to the provision of local public goods.
There is evidence of direct cash transfers made by local merchant guilds to rulers throughout Europe, from England and Germany to Italy and Spain. 62 In addition to direct cash transfers, other forms of transfer were widespread, yielding substantial bene…ts for rulers. Thus local merchant guilds provided valuable assistance with the collection of trade taxes (taxes on merchants that were not exempt). 63 They also helped to alleviate medieval rulers' …nancing constraints by providing large loans, at a time when borrowing large amounts was not easy for rulers. 64 Finally, local merchant guilds were an important source of naval and military assistance, and political support, for medieval rulers. 65 
Additional implications and historical evidence
Beyond the predictions just discussed, our analysis yields several other implications. We now discuss these, together with the historical evidence on them.
Prediction 5 (Exclusive membership and merchant inequality): Guilds may impose restrictions on membership, and these may generate wealth inequality among merchants In our model, the negative implications of guilds for equality among merchants arise when the following three conditions are satis…ed: (i) the optimal guild size falls short of the total number of potentially active merchants (i.e., n < N ); (ii) the merchant guild generates a surplus relative to the revenues that would be raised by a tax collector (i.e., W (n ) > V T ); (iii)
the merchant guild has su¢ cient social capital, and hence bargaining power, to secure part of 6 the surplus it generates (i.e., < 1). In this case, guilded merchants will enjoy higher pro…ts than excluded merchants.
Did local merchant guilds restrict membership?
Historically, the answer is yes: membership was often contingent on having 'citizenship'or 'burgess'or 'free'status, from which many were excluded. 66 As towns grew, attracting large numbers of rural immigrants, this exclusion a¤ected an increasing number of urban inhabitants. In England for instance, "big towns had populations most of whose members were not 'free'-e.g., two thirds in late-thirteenth-century in London, a half in Oxford and more than three quarters in Exeter" (Hilton, 1992, pp. 92) .
A key requirement for membership of local merchant guilds was the payment of entry fees and a variety of dues 67 , which is consistent with our model (members collectively needed to fund transfers to the ruler). This implied the exclusion of those who could not a¤ord to pay the, often substantial, entry fees, or who were unable to provide the required guarantees: "To become a gildsman...it was necessary to pay certain initiation-fees...The new comer was also required to produce sureties, who were responsible for the ful…lment of his obligations to the Gild -answering for his good conduct and for the payment of his dues" (Gross, 1890, pp. 28).
The historical evidence makes it clear that many of the towns'inhabitants could not meet these requirements. 68 Moreover, admission to local merchant guilds was sometimes controlled by requiring that the potential new member be approved by a majority of existing members, and this requirement appears to have been used to restrict membership. 69 In sum, local merchant guilds excluded an increasing proportion of the urban population, notably the least wealthy.
Prediction 6 (Guilds' social capital and town government): Guilds with lower coordination costs ( f ) are more likely to engage in other collective activities that bene…t guild members Our analysis highlights the importance of merchant guilds'social capital in reducing members'costs of coordination and organization. An important implication of this is that guilds with substantial social capital were likely to engage in additional collective activities -beyond those required to enforce successfully, and pro…t from, their exclusive rights over trade -which were in their members' collective interest. Perhaps the most important example of this is the role played by merchant guilds in the emergence of town government throughout medieval Europe. Fryde (1985, pp. 216-7) , reviewing the contributions to English historiography by Tait (1936) 70 and Martin (1963) 71 , notes how "in some towns the gild provided the …rst administration independent of the town lord, set up by the townsfolk themselves, regardless of whether the lord was the king, a nobleman or a great abbot... a large proportion of the so-called borough records which survive from the thirteenth century are, in fact, gild records". Moreover, guilds often took on tasks normally undertaken by local government: "in Leicester and Bristol for instance, the gild was responsible for road, bridge and wall building and the gild chest ful…lled the role of a town treasury".
In Germany, merchant guilds in towns such as Cologne played a key role in gaining autonomy from feudal lords, and directing the administration of the town (Dollinger, 1964, pp. 27-28) .
A similar pattern can be found throughout Italy (Racine, 1985, pp. 142-44) . In Flanders too, guilds played an important role in the politics and administration of towns such as Arras, Bruges, Ghent, Lille, Saint-Omer. 72 
Extensions
The analysis developed up to this point hinges on a few simplifying assumptions. In this section we show that its basic insights carry over when these are relaxed, and obtain some additional implications.
Downward sloping demand and production costs. Our results clearly do not hinge on assuming a unit demand or normalizing merchant costs to zero. To see this, consider a setting in which merchants face a downward-sloping demand curve for their product, say D (p), and a unit cost c > 0. We abstract from uncertainty for simplicity -i.e., normalize = 1.
Letting p M arg max p D (p) (p c) ; be the monopoly price, we can de…ne the monopoly pro…t as
It is then easy to show that the tax collector solution will entail setting a unit tax such that the equilibrium price will be the monopoly price -i.e., t = p M c for every -and the tax collector will extract all the merchants'pro…ts. Similarly, all the results derived in the regime with a guild will go through, with the di¤erence that now represents the monopoly pro…ts.
Allowing explicitly for merchant costs is interesting because it highlights another important role for guilds: securing goods at the lowest possible cost to their members, thereby maximizing 7 0 The Medieval English Borough (Manchester 1936). 7 monopoly pro…ts. In particular, it is clear from the analysis that the same coordination and collusion ability that allows guild members to exercise monopoly power e¢ ciently relative to consumers can help them to exercise monopsony power relative to suppliers. Indeed, the preemption rights imposed by guilds on alien merchants (discussed earlier) can be interpreted as facilitating the exercise of such monopsony power.
Imperfect commitment. Our baseline analysis assumed that the ruler can make long-term commitments. Thus both regimes entailed a single ex-ante transfer to the ruler: the tax collector paid for his future tax revenues from obtaining the tax farm, while the merchant guild paid for its future pro…ts from being given recognition and privileges (exclusive trading rights). If the ruler cannot make long-term commitments, the single ex-ante transfer will be replaced by a fee paid to the ruler at the beginning of every period. For the tax collector, this makes no di¤erence: each period, before observing the realization of demand, he pays his fee to the ruler, which is the expected value of what he will raise this period. Then he observes the realization of demand: if it is high he sets the tax rate t = and collects the resulting tax revenues; if it is zero there is no trade and hence no tax revenues.
Under the guild regime, the equivalent of this is that at the beginning of each period, before observing the realization of demand, guild members get together and collectively pay the ruler a fee, equal to a share of the expected value of their net joint pro…ts in that period. If anyone does not pay his share of this fee, the guild is abolished, and all merchants make zero pro…ts from then on. The key di¤erence between this setting and the one with a single ex-ante transfer to the ruler is that merchants'expected future returns from collusion now have to take into account the future fees to be paid to the ruler, which makes it harder to sustain collusion: formally, the e¤ect is akin to the e¤ect of the coordination and organization cost f . 73 Thus imperfect commitment tends to make the guild regime less attractive, relative to the tax collector regime. One implication is that kings and powerful lords should have been more likely to grant recognition and privileges to merchant guilds than smaller, less powerful lords, since they had greater commitment power, other things held equal.
We investigated this implication using the list of English merchant guilds in Gross (1890, pp. 9-16) . Of these, we found that 66% had been granted recognition and privileges by kings, and 16% by lords. For the remainder, it was di¢ cult to establish whether the privileges were …rst granted by kings or lords, because some early documentation has been lost, and privileges were often con…rmed at later dates by subsequent charters (typically by kings). Even if we assume that in all these cases the privileges were …rst granted by lords, it is clearly the case that the majority of merchant guilds were granted recognition and privileges by kings rather than lords.
Moreover, the 16% …gure includes merchant guilds granted by powerful lords such as Robert 
Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a theory of the emergence, operation and decline of merchant guilds.
We have examined the costs and bene…ts to medieval rulers of granting recognition and exclusive rights to trade to merchant guilds, together with tax exemptions, in return for direct transfers.
Our theory has highlighted the role of the guilds'social capital in sustaining collusion, which is crucial for their ability to deliver su¢ cient bene…ts to rulers.
It is useful at this point to review alternative theories of merchant guilds, and relate them to our model. Greif et al. (1994) , as noted earlier, provide a theory of the development of alien merchant guilds: that is, guilds of foreign (alien) merchants in a particular polity, who were granted recognition by the ruler of that polity. Their focus, therefore, di¤ers from ours: we propose a theory of the development of local merchant guilds -i.e., guilds of local merchants in a particular polity, who were granted recognition (and privileges) by the ruler of that polity.
Historically, the vast majority of merchant guilds emerged as local merchant guilds: only a subset of these went on to establish foreign branches, or consulates, in other polities -i.e. alien merchant guilds. Local merchant guilds dominated local trade and had a substantial impact on the development of medieval towns: to our knowledge, we provide the …rst formal model of this important historical institution.
It is nevertheless interesting to compare the two theories. The crucial ingredient of the Greif et al. theory is imperfect commitment by the ruler. We saw in the previous section that this does not provide an explanation for the emergence of local merchant guilds. In their model, it provides an explanation for the emergence of alien merchant guilds, as follows. The ruler can expropriate alien merchants who come to trade in his polity, or fail to provide a commercially secure environment. This reduces trade below the e¢ cient level. The ruler would therefore like to commit not to 'misbehave'(expropriation, commercial insecurity). He cannot do so credibly unless alien merchants can, in turn, credibly threaten to boycott trade in the polity if the ruler misbehaves. This requires alien merchants to belong to an organization able to enforce its members'compliance with any trade embargo imposed by the organization: a 'guild'.
Interestingly, this provides a clear link with our work: in our theory, the most successful merchant guilds are those with higher social capital (lower x and f ), enabling them to coordinate successfully and jointly undertake actions in their members'collective interest. We would, A di¤erent possible explanation for the emergence of merchant guilds concerns the ruler's time preference 74 : rulers sometimes needed to raise substantial revenues to fund current expenditures (e.g., wars), and may have attached a greater weight to the present than merchants.
However, this does not provide a compelling case for reliance on merchant guilds rather than, for example, tax farming 75 . Indeed, our analysis has examined the trade-o¤s involved in choosing between these two alternatives. Historians such as Gross (1890) and Brentano (1870) have given us invaluable insights into the evolution and operation of merchant guilds. However, their accounts, sometimes highly critical of merchant guilds'collusive practices, do not explain why medieval rulers were happy to grant merchant guilds recognition and privileges, including the exclusive rights to trade on which these collusive practices were based.
This paper has proposed a uni…ed theory, able to reconcile previous explanations and the large body of historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. In doing so, it has also shed some light on the role of the guilds' social capital, and its importance for taxation, and the development of towns and their government in medieval Europe.
Finally, some remarks about welfare. Obviously, a full evaluation of the welfare consequences of medieval merchant guilds is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, we can say something. Our analysis has shown that the impact of merchant guilds on social welfare was complex. Clearly, any attempt to evaluate the e¢ ciency implications of the emergence of medieval merchant guilds requires a plausible historical counterfactual. From the perspective of medieval rulers seeking to raise revenues from the taxation of local trade, reliance on tax collectors (tax farmers) seems a plausible counterfactual. By comparing the merchant guild regime with the tax collector regime, we have been able to characterize the circumstances in which the merchant guild regime represents an e¢ ciency improvement, making it possible to minimize the costs involved in raising the desired revenue. While this clearly bene…ts rulers and guilded merchants, who share the gains, it generally leaves consumers indi¤erent, since the prices they have to pay in the guild regime are the same as they would have to pay in the tax collector regime. The exception occurs for realizations of demand that require guilded merchants to coordinate on a price lower than the monopoly price: in this case consumers are better o¤ with the merchant guild regime.
Overall, this points to a positive assessment of the welfare impact of the emergence of merchant guilds. However, we need to be cautious in our conclusions. Merchant guilds' social capital helped their members to collude e¤ectively, and secure a share of collusive pro…ts, but this sometimes required exclusion of individuals who would have liked to become guild members. While these individuals were not economically worse o¤ than they would have been in the tax collector regime, the merchant guild regime did foster inequality within the merchant class, between increasingly wealthy guilded merchants and those who were excluded from their pro…table trade. Similarly, we have seen that guilded merchants' social capital helped them play an important role in the development and administration of medieval towns, and in gaining autonomy from feudal lords. But it also enabled them, in many cases, to impose rules that bene…ted them relative to producers, fostering inequality between merchants and craftsmen.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result follows directly from the sign of the derivative of (n). As explained in the text, @ (n) @n 0 when x x. Hence, by A1 the self-enforceability constraint (2) always holds in this region of parameters regardless of n. Next, consider the case x < x. In this region of parameters @ (n) @n < 0. Hence, (n) 0 if and only if (n 1)
which yields immediately n. Applying the Implicit function Theorem to (n) 0 it is easy to verify that @n @ = 1 + 1 n
where 1 + 1 > n, otherwise (n) < 0 for any n. Hence, @n @ > 0 in the region of parameters under consideration. Similarly, using A1, it can be shown that @n @ = 1 (1 ) (n 1)
and that @n @
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose …rst that x x. In this region of parameters the guild's objective function is decreasing in n and @ (n) @n < 0. Hence, the optimal density is n = 1, which is a viable solution under A1. Next suppose that x 2 (x; x]. In this region of parameters the guild's objective function is increasing in n while @ (n) @n 0. Hence, the optimal density is n = n < N . Finally, consider the range x > x. In this case the guild's objective function is increasing and @ (n) @n > 0. Hence, the optimal density is n = N .
Proof of Proposition 3. Although in the paper we have con…ned attention to the case in which n is interior -i.e., x 2 (x; x) -for completeness here we will prove the result by considering every possible guild's size. Suppose …rst that x x, so that n = 1. Replacing n = 1 into the guilds'objective function one immediately obtains W (1) = ( x (N 1)) 1 :
Comparing W (1) and V T we have W (1) > V T , 0
x (N 1) ; which by A1 is in the unit interval (0; 1). Notice also that 0 is increasing in x and N , and decreasing in . Next suppose that x 2 (x; x), so that n = n < N . Replacing n = n into the guilds' objective function one immediately obtains W (n) = W (1) + (n 1) ( x f ) 1 :
Comparing W (n) and V T we have W (n) V T = ( x (N 1)) (n 1) (f x) 1
Note that, as long as = 0 then W (n) < V T , while W (n) > V T when = 1. Hence:
Using the de…nition of n the threshold 1 can be rewritten as 1 0 ( x (N 1)) ( x f ) (x x) :
Recalling that
x f + (1 ) ; simple di¤erentiation of 1 implies that this threshold is increasing in N and f , while decreasing in and . To study the impact of and x it is more convenient to observe that by Lemma 1 n is increasing in and decreasing in x. Di¤erentiating with respect to
implying that @ 1 @ < 0. Di¤erentiating with respect to x we have
implying that @ 1 @x < 0.
Finally, suppose that x x, so that n = N . Replacing n = N into the guilds'objective function one immediately obtains W (N ) = f (N 1) 1 :
Comparing W (N ) and V T we have immediately W (N ) V T , 2 f (N 1) ; with 2 2 (0; 1) by A1 and 2 being increasing in N and f , and decreasing in and . Hence, the result stated in the proposition follows immediately by setting 1 = .
Further Extensions
Constraints on the guild density. Lemma 1 and subsequent results hinge on assumption A1 which guarantees that both a single-member guild and a guild that includes all merchants are viable. Now we argue that our qualitative insights would not change if these assumptions were relaxed. Consider …rst x(N 1) < 0 and (N 1) f 0: in this case a single monopolist is not able to prevent unauthorized trade by its N 1 competitors, whereas operating costs are not so high as to prevent a full-size guild. Hence, a necessary condition for a guild to be viable is
x(N n) 0, which implies an endogenous minimal guild density n 0 N x . Recalling that (n) 1 [ x(N 1)] (n 1)
it follows that a necessary condition to prevent undercutting is now x x. In this case (n) 0 requires n n 1 1 + x(N 1) x x :
The ruler has thus the option of recognizing a guild if and only if N 1 + x(N 1) x x , N 1 + x :
When this condition is met, it can be easily veri…ed that the optimal guild size is n = N , so that Propositions 2 and 3 stilly apply, but only for x x. Otherwise, the ruler prefers the tax collector. Next, consider x(N 1) 0 and (N 1) f < 0. This means that, in addition to the constraints stated in Lemma 1, there is an additional endogenous upper-bound to the guild density which comes from the constraint (
x(N 1)) (n 1) (f x ) 0;
which can bind only when x x. However, in this region of parameters n = 1. Hence, the results of the baseline model go through even in this case.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that when (N 1) min x; f ;
in which imperfect collusion may occur in equilibrium. In particular, if demand can take more than two values, it can be the case that for very high demand states the equilibrium will entail imperfect collusion -i.e., guilded merchants will charge a price below the monopoly price (albeit still above the competitive price, hence still a collusive price). The intuition for this is that for very high demand states, the spot gain from deviation may be too high to sustain the perfectly collusive outcome. Formally, we can study this possibility by assuming that the consumer's willingness to pay, v , is determined by the realization of a continuous random variable drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0; 1], which is identically and independently distributed over time (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) . For simplicity we abstract from explicit consideration of exclusion and coordination costs (i.e., we set x = f = 0), and just assume that one-member guilds are not feasible 78 , so that the guild regime requires collusion.
Let n (where N > n > 1) be the subset of active merchants belonging to the guild. A collusive outcome is sustainable as long as it is in each merchant's best interest not to break the agreement. This requires v n + E [v] (1 )n v;
in any given state v. The left-hand side of this condition can be interpreted as the (discounted) gain from cooperation, while the right-hand side is the spot gain from deviation. Rearranging equation (2) 
Thus for su¢ ciently large realizations of v it may not be possible to sustain full collusioni.e., the potential gain from deviation becomes too large. In this case, the collusive agreement will require merchants to set the highest possible price level compatible with the 'no cheating' condition (6) so as to mitigate the temptation to undercut. More precisely, there exists a threshold v 1 such that: for all v v full collusion is viable and each merchant obtains earns v=n, while for v > v full collusion is not sustainable and the maximal pro…t that a guild member can obtain is v =n. 79 The threshold v is endogenously de…ned by (6) holding as an equality -i.e., v = E [v] (n 1) (1 ) ;
where
Hence, when demand is su¢ ciently high, the guild will obtain an aggregate pro…t (v ) which is lower than the monopoly level. Substituting (8) into (7) we have v = (n 1) (1 )
Notice that the larger is the guild density -i.e., the larger is n -the lower is v , since each 7 8 Historically, we have found no records of one-member merchant guilds. The smallest guild size we are aware of is n = 23, for the …sh merchants'guild in Worms (see, e.g., Seider, 2005, p. 49). 7 9 The case where v < 1 corresponds to instances where in order to support collusion in states higher than v merchants must charge a price lower than the monopoly one. Formally, this implies that the guild total pro…t in each of these states is v with = v =v 1.
merchant is tempted to deviate more often when the gain from collusion has to be shared among many. Hence, a collusive outcome can obtain as long as the guild density does not exceed the endogenous upper-bound n above which v = 0 -i.e., v > 0 , n < n 1 1 ;
with n now being the solution with respect to n of v = 0. As a result, when N is large enough some merchants will be excluded from trade. This extension of the model is interesting for two reasons: …rst, because it shows that restrictions on guild membership can arise as a consequence of the need to sustain collusive outcomes when faced with high realizations of demand. Second, because it highlights a possible advantage of the guild regime from the point of view of consumers, relative to the tax collector regime: consumers would clearly be better o¤ under the guild regime in high demand states (v > v ), since they would pay a price below the monopoly price.
